“I constantly self-censor to ensure my personal safety and the continuity of my work.”

These words, spoken by one of our research participants, reflect a growing reality for human rights defenders worldwide. But how common is self-censorship, and what forces drive it?

To answer these questions, Data4Change, commissioned by The Syria Campaign, conducted an in-depth research project exploring self-censorship among activists from Syria, Palestine, and Ukraine. For these individuals—who document war crimes or advocate for justice for their fellow citizens— every word they say or write online carries risk. Whether it’s fear of online harassment, state surveillance, or the threat of real-world violence, many are forced to weigh the consequences of speaking out against remaining silent.

Why this research matters

The Syrian revolution and conflict, the war in Ukraine, and the genocide in Palestine have been documented and live-streamed by people on frontlines and in diaspora—people like the ones we interviewed for our research. Social media has played a crucial role in exposing war crimes and human rights abuses in all three geographical contexts, often serving as the primary source of real-time information in these conflicts.

However, this unprecedented access to documentation comes with significant risks. The very platforms that provide a voice to those in danger are also spaces of intimidation, harassment, and censorship. Many human rights activists and citizen journalists face the threat of having their accounts suspended, their content removed, or worse—being targeted by digital mobs or state surveillance. The fear of these consequences forces many to self-censor, shaping how and what they share online.

Our research set out to understand the scale of this issue, the motivations behind self-censorship, and the impact it has on public discourse. By listening to affected individuals rather than imposing preconceived notions, we aimed to develop a nuanced understanding of self-censorship as both a defense mechanism and a limitation.

Over the course of 310 minutes of listening sessions—conducted in July 2024—with 12 human rights activists from Syria, Palestine and Ukraine (some based in-country, others had been forced to seek asylum abroad), we uncovered a pattern of fear-driven self-restraint. Many described how even a single post could be weaponised against them, forcing them to delete, rethink, or avoid speaking altogether. One participant from Ukraine recalled how criticising a public figure resulted in an online mob targeting them: “Now, I always hesitate before engaging, especially with high-profile accounts.”

Our research process

To ensure that our findings were deeply rooted in real experiences, we designed a participatory research model based on active listening. Our approach centered around creating safe spaces where individuals could share their thoughts and fears candidly. This was achieved through pre-workshop surveys, structured listening sessions, and collective discussions.

Key elements of our process:

Pre-workshop surveys: Participants provided insights into their personal journeys with self-censorship before engaging in discussions.
Listening sessions: We facilitated three in-depth listening sessions that allowed participants to reflect on their experiences of self-censorship in both individual and group settings.
Group discussions: These helped surface common themes, shared concerns, and patterns that shaped participants' choices in digital and offline spaces.
Collaborative analysis: We supported participants to co-create definitions and highlight recurring themes that emerged from the discussions.
Thematic glossary: A key outcome of this process was a glossary that encapsulates essential terms and concepts related to self-censorship, reflecting the diverse perspectives shared.

Human rights activists from Syria, Palestine and Ukraine took part in the listening sessions and research.

Who was involved

This research was made possible through the voices and experiences of a diverse group of individuals across multiple locations. In close partnership with The Syria Campaign and digital rights groups, we invited human rights activists from Syria, Palestine and Ukraine who have been posting content online and on social media about the conflicts for a long time:

12 participants shared their personal experiences and insights.
3 Country Contexts, Palestine, Syria, and Ukraine, provided case studies that illustrated different challenges and coping mechanisms.
8 Host Countries represented the varying legal, social, and cultural landscapes that shape self-censorship.
310 Listening Minutes were dedicated to in-depth conversations, ensuring that each voice was heard and respected.
∞ Insights emerged from these discussions, highlighting the complexity of self-censorship.
1 Thematic Glossary was developed to capture and define key terms that surfaced throughout our sessions.

What we learned

Through this process, we uncovered deeply personal and often painful experiences of self-censorship. Participants described how fear of government retaliation, social exclusion, and targeted harassment dictated what they could or could not say online. Many felt that their words could be taken out of context, weaponized against them, or used to harm their families and communities.

Several themes emerged across the different country contexts:

Personal and social pressure: Participants spoke of the internal conflict between wanting to share their truth and fearing the consequences. Many struggled with balancing personal expression with societal expectations, particularly the pressure to conform to family, community, or national narratives. The fear of bringing harm to their loved ones was a constant source of anxiety. Some described the overwhelming sense of “preemptive regret,” anticipating negative outcomes before even considering posting. Others hesitated to speak out because they feared their words could be manipulated and used against them or their cause.
Psychological toll: Many described the emotional exhaustion of constantly self-monitoring their speech. The weight of suppression led to isolation, anxiety, and a pervasive sense of helplessness.
Geographic and political context: The severity of self-censorship varied by location. Some participants noted that, while restrictions in exile were different from those inside their home countries, fear still played a major role in shaping their actions.
Digital platform bias: Participants highlighted the systemic biases embedded in social media platforms, with many expressing frustration over inconsistent content moderation policies that disproportionately impacted certain voices.
The shift to offline and encrypted communication: Faced with increasing online threats, many participants turned to encrypted messaging apps or in-person conversations as safer alternatives to open discourse on mainstream platforms.

This research reinforced that self-censorship is not a passive act but a survival strategy. However, it also comes at a high cost, limiting public discourse, eroding trust in online platforms, and diminishing the ability to hold power to account.

The listening sessions and the research we did laid the foundation for the final report ‘The Silencing Effect’.

Impact of our research

Our research directly led to a bigger and broader research project launched in February 2025 called ‘The Silencing Effect’, where Data4Change in partnership with The Syria Campaign and polling company RIWI surveyed 4,138 people across the UK, France, and Germany to understand how self-censorship operates beyond conflict zones. It examines how self-censorship online by “regular people” who care about world events in turn affects the human rights activists on the ground reporting on it, and ultimately what the impact of all this collective self-censorship has on us as societies.

Researching self-censorship among human rights activists